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Corporate ideology and store managers: 
Implication from a J apanese retailer1l 
Yi ZHU* 
Absiract 
Using an anthropological approach， this paper examines a ] apanese fashion 
retailer (referred to by the pseudonym “Ichi") in Hong Kong to reveal the dynamic 
and complex relations between corporate ideology and employee behavior. Based on 
long-term participant observation， this paper seeks to explain how Ichi's corporate 
ideology formed and how store managers have interpreted it. This paper suggests that 
the formation of Ichi's ideology， or what has been referred to as “Ichi's DNA，" has been 
influenced by the founder's legacy and by its overseas experiences. Ichi's ideology has 
two major principles: that sales must be increased and that in overseas stores，“]apanese-
siyle" customer service must be provided without adaptation to local markets under the 
“Global One" policy. 1n disseminating its corporate ideology among local employees in 
Hong Kong， the company has sought to facilitate company崎wideuniiy by promoting the 
adoption of a shared set of values and the emergence of a distinct institutional culture. 
This paper demonstrates that store managers， acting based on different interpretations 
of the corporate ideology， manage human relations， differently influencing the store 
atmosphere and employee relations. This anthropological study gives insight into 
management studies in the context of globalization and localization discourses. 
Corporate ideology could be influenced by both rational strategies firms implement and 
by employee politics. By exploring the relationship between corporate ideology and 
employee behaviors， this study seeks to address the gap beiween corporate ideology 
and practices. 
Keywords: corporate ideology， store manager， customer service， fashion retail， 
employee behavior 
In甘oduc註on
Ichi， a leading J apanese fashion retailer， opened its largest flagship store on a well-
known shopping street in Shanghai on September 30， 2013. The store， Ichi's 46th in main-
1) This work is partiaIy based on the author's thesis entitled Control and maniPulation: the company building 
pr仰oc印esおs0/αjα戸αηnesej舟b加S幼hioη6仰ηte}ゆpns印e1問ηHo仰n，悠gKong f介romUni討ve臼r叫匂守T0ぱfHong Kong and it also inc1udes t出he
data collected by t出:hefieldwo印rkf1釦mdedby The Ma抗ts釦ushitaKonosuke Memorial Foundation. 
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land China， occupies 6，600 m2 in a five-story building also occupied by four other brands 
owned by Ichi Group， Ichi's parent company. Almost 2，000 customers lined up in front of the 
store before the opening， although it was a weekday. As the doors opened at 10:00， dozens 
streamed into the store; security guards wer・enecessary to ensure their safe守.
Ichi's popularity is ref1ected in its sales. The CEO and founder of Ichi and Ichi Group， 
Takahiro Sakai，2l announced years ago that the company's sales would reach 1 trilion yen; 
among the media and Ichi employees， this announcement was met with disbelief. However， 
in 2013， Ichi became the first company in the Japanese fashion industry with sales topping 
1 trilion yen; the company has become the fourth-leading fashion retailer in its category 
worldwide. 
As a global fashion retailer， how has Ichi built up its corporate ideology?羽市atrole did 
the founder play in creating the company ideology? How has the company disseminated this 
ideology overseas and how have local employees reacted to it? This anthropological study 
addresses how Ichi's corporate ideology has been formed， how store managers at Ichi Hong 
Kong have interpreted the corporate ideology differently， and how their varied interpreta-
tions have given rise to various aspects of the store culture. Ichi's corporate ideology was 
influenced by the founder's philosophy and the company's historical development. It has 
two major principles: that sales must be increased and that J apanese-style customer service 
must be provided. This paper discusses in detail how store managers' various interpreta-
tions of the corporate ideology have transformed human relations at an Ichi store. 
To provide a context for the research iねmework，in the following section， the literature 
on corporate ideology is reviewed and the importance of anthropological study for under-
standing corporate ideologies and store cultures is discussed. 
Literature on corporate ideolo母7
Corporate ideology is the beliefs and values that provide a reference frame to members 
of an organization (Starbuck 1982) and it includes a system of ideas， beliefs， meanings and 
concepts prioritized and institutionalized by the corporation (Fox 2006). Corporate ideology 
is expected to inf1uence the performance， growth， and survival of the firm binding the orga-
nization together (Beyer 1981). This section will review how the corporate ideology， particu-
larly that of J apanese companies has been studied. 
Company's ideology has been largely neglected in organizational studies of the com-
pany. Research on the organizational study began when the publication of Max Weber's 
seminal work established. He argues subjectivity of individuals forms the pa社ernof social 
organization and people's behaviors and interactions have a distinct relationship with spe-
cific cultur討 contexts.In the same vein as羽Webe町r乍 V吋iewpoωinば1託t，the modernist perspective 
or rationalist approach could be regarded as the starting point of the field of organizational 
study. This approach has been adopted by scholars trying to discover the fundamentals of 
or・ganizationalrationality and the relationship between formal structure and informal forms 
2) Fictitious names have been used to avoicl iclentifying the company basecl on a conficlentiality agreement 
between the company ancl the author. 
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(Moeran 2013:3). Scholars examine the systematic nature of the organizations， particularly 
bureaucracies， which have been the subject of numerous studies on organizational design. 
Subsequently， scholars started to put members of organizations at the center of their 
research on organizational culture， leadership， and management， and scholars attempted 
to examine the general pictur・eof the structure and function of organizations based on em-
pirical data. The emergence of the study of issues of decision making and choice within an 
organization also emerged at the same time (Simon 1976). Studies by sociologists and an-
thropologists started to receive more attention within the field， and many scholars in man-
agement studies began to focus on the culture within organizations. Culture is now consid-
ered as a possible candidate to explain varied organizational behaviors and levels of stability 
in groups (Schein 1990; Ouchi 1981). 
The issue of culture within organizations became the focus of scholars， and this trend 
intensified with the economic boom in Japan from the 1970s to the early 1980s， when Japan 
had a growing presence in the wor1d， as the economic situation in some ¥iVestern countries， 
especial1y the United States， was unfavorable. The study of the Japanese miracle prompted 
the emergence of the nihonjinroκwhich stresses the idea that the cultural distinctions in-
herent in J apanese culture al・ethe most influential factors on the country's business success 
(Abegglen 1956， 1973; Christopher 1983; Curtis 1969; Drucker 1971; Gibney 1998; Ouchi 
1981; Reischauer 1977; VogeI1979). Literature related to n幻z.幼honfρinr.仰onclaims that i泊ndustrす七Ie均正a
f白ami出l日ia討lism，represented by harmonious worker relations， a focus on workers' welfare， col-
lectivism， and so on， have formed the ideology of the J apanese company. 
We could infer from the research of niho仰'inronthat there might be cultural influences 
on the management of Japanese companies; however， we cannot look into the cultural as-
pect in isolation when we study companies as pl・ofit-makingcenters. The literature of Japa-
nese economists has permitted us to pay attention to the rational aspect of company systems 
(Koike 1984， 1995; Aoki 1986， 1990， 1991， 1992). However， their research approaches have 
failed to disclose the ful picture of corporate ideology since it is not possible to confir・m
whether the corporate ideology is practiced in reality， as companies have claimed without 
direct observation by researchers. 
Anti-nihonjinron literature has emerged since the methodology used by previous 
scholars over-simplified the fact that every J apanese company has distinctive features and 
does not fal under an overarching type of management. Ethnographic studies written by 
scholars， including Clark (1979)， Fruin (1983)， N oguchi (1990)， Kondo (1990)， Hamabata 
(1990)， Wong (1999)， Matsunaga (2000) Graham (2003)， Mitchell (2007) and Zhu (2013， 
2014 and 2015) have contributed to the deconstruction of the simple cultural explanation. 
For instance， Matsunaga (2000) and Wong (1999) examined the case in Japanese retailers. 
Through fieldwork， Matsunaga concludes that the changing J apanese economy has a strong 
influence on the ideology of the company as community (2000). Heung Wah Wong's work 
(1999) helps us to understand how the company managed employees within the context of 
the company's ideology and a dual structure that placed Japanese workers in superior posi-
tions over local employees. 
Findings of Matsunaga (2000) and Wong (1999) indicate corporate ideology plays sig-
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nificant role and has been utilized by the company for the favour of their intention. However， 
both of them failed to provide the picture of how store managers who were considered as 
mediators between the company and stores inter・pretthe corporate ideology and how their 
interpretations influence employee behaviours. 
This paper wi1l reveal how the corporate ideology of Ichi has been formed and the 
implementation process of corporate ideology into Hong Kong market seeking to apply its 
ideology to local employees to promote a “shared" set of values. Stories of two store manag-
ers in a store wil1 be introduced to c1ariかtherelationship beiween the corporate ideology 
and employee behaviors. The next section will discuss why the anthropological fyamework 
is important to achieve the above research goa1s. 
Methodolo母r
This paper is based on the anthropological fieldwork conducted from August 2010 to 
2013 at Ichi stores in Hong Kong. After geiting the permission from the local head office for 
research， 1 had opportunities to work at several stores. During the participant observation 
period， 1 worked at Ichi stores five days a week and eight hours a day as an intern.3) 
Of the various methodologies， anthropological research conducted through long-term 
fieldworl王hasmost influenced our understanding of the organizational nature of culture 
(Moeran 2013:2). In-depth participant observation allows researchers to understand the 
human behaviours beyond the corporate ideology in order to gain a broader picture of the 
institutional culture of Ichi. The ethnographic approach has allowed us to illuminate and 
provide a rich un derstanding of speci自corganizational phenomena and， moreover， itcould 
help us build a better theory (Barley 1983; Schein 1990; Van Maanen 2011). Ethnography 
requires‘thick description' as Geertz c1aims (1973:5) so that direct observation is the pl・e-
ferred research method. 
Researchers are able to take a broad view when they examine the changes between em-
ployees and organizations by conducting fieldwork (Moeran 2005). This advantage results 
in finding the connections between unrelated aspects permits the use of data to understand 
dynamics at work in general， which differentiates field work-based research from the work 
of scholars in management schools， especially in terms data analysis. 
It is not sufficient to observe human behaviour over a shor・ttime period since corporate 
ideology and group boundaries within the corporate structure might change along with 
internal and external factors， as these boundaries are also subjective and continuously nego-
tiated among people. Kondo (1990) argues that cultur・eis a process and a system of negoti-
ated meanings rather than an absolute. This paper wi1 start with the description of Ichi's 
background information and how its corporate ideology has linkage with founder legacy 
and overseas expansion. 
Ichi and the formation of its corporate ideology 
Ichi and its par・entcompany， Ichi Group， were established in 1984. The company has not 
3) Internship program for university graduates in Ichi has startecl half a year after my fielclwork. 
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only survived the J apanese recession but has become the largest apparel firm in Asia. Given 
its net sales， Ichi has atlracted substantial attention overseas. Ichi's 2014 annual report in-
dicated net sales of 1.38 trilion yen ($13 bi1ion) and an operating income of 148 billion yen 
($1.4 bi1ion). In 2015， Ichi Group was ranked fourth among worldwide fashion retailers us-
ing the SPA (specialty store retailer of private label apparel) business mode1.4l Ichi Gr・oup
was the first Asian fashion company to rank in the global top five. 
Among Ichi's three major segments-Ichi J apan， Ichi International， and Global 
Brands-Ichi Japan predominates in sales. In March 2015， Ichi Japan， with 852 stores， ac-
counted for 51.7% of total net sales， totaling 715 billion yen. Ichi International comprises al 
overseas operations; with 633 stores， itaccounted for 29.9% of total net sales， totaling 413 bil-
lion yen. Global Brands comprises one local and three overseas brands; with 1，085 stores， it 
accounted for 18.2% of net sales， totaling 153 billion yen. 
Among the segments， Ichi International has exhibited the highest growth rate: it has 
seen increases of 64.7% in net sales and 89.5% in operating income. Moreover， ithas opened 
187 new stores. Among al overseas markets， sales in the greater China area (Hong Kong， 
Taiwan， and mainland China)， totaling $208 billion， have comprised almost half of the sales 
of Ichi International. The company has viewed this development positively and has an-
nounced that it wil continue to expand its business in these markets. This paper examines 
Hong Kong， wher・eIchi obtained its first overseas success. 
The following section describes the legacy of Takahiro Sakai and the formation of the 
Ichi ideology. Subsequently， the core pr・inciplesof the Ichi ideology are explained. 
Ichi's corporate ideology and出elegacy of i臼 founder
With Ichi's increasing media exposure， Takahiro Sakai， Ichi's founder and president， 
has become known for his harせ1，straightforward opinions and ambition to make Ichi the 
world's number-one apparel company. Sakai's management philosophy has substantially in-
fluenced the formation and development of Ichi' s corporate ideology. 
Sakai's ideas are fundamentally based on the concept of crisis awareness. Based on 
crisis awareness， the company has sought to grow overseas， toadapt to changing markets， 
and to enhance its uniquely J apanese advantages. Witnessing the collapse of the J apanese 
bubble economy affected Sakai; he indicated that he has felt that the economy and compa-
nies could be so fragile that “collapse" could be possible at any time. Furthermore， he has 
spoken of his feeling of being pressured， particularly after having inherited the company 
from his father. 
After inheriting the company from his father as a high-end suit shop in the 1970s， Sakai 
determined that the suit business was limited. On a tI匂tothe US， he discovered major SPA 
companies that had emerged in the 1980s， including Gap， Limited， and other chain stores 
using self-service business models; believing that an SPA company could service the huge 
market for low-priced casual wear among young people in J apan， Sakai shifted the focus of 
4) Apparel companies that design， manufacture， and sel their own clothes at their own retail stores are saicl to 
use the SPA model. The term originates from Gap， a casual clothing company from the US 
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his business from suits to casual wea工Ichibegan to pr・oduceaffordable and relatively fash-
ionable casual wear targeted to young people; eventually， however， the company came to 
target al generations and focus on basic， functional clothing. Using these strategies， Sakai 
attempted to adapt to changing market needs. 
In the 1990s， Sakai noted that the products of many J apanese companies that had 
moved production to China had suffered in quality; subsequently， Ichi began to pay sub-
stantial attention to quality control. The rising yen and the signing of the Plaza Accord in 
1985 made clothing more affordable for the masses. However， inreality， Sakai observed that 
many manufacturers who had tried to keep costs down by moving production from J apan 
to main1and China had failed at qua1ity contr01 because they did not manage their own 10-
ca1 factol・ies.In an interview， Sakai indicated that， having accumu1ated experience in main-
land China， the company directed its focus to qua1ity contr・01to produce “clothing with fine 
craftsmanship，" which he believed was an essential characteristic of clothing produced by a 
J apanese company. 
Sakai has also indicated that clothing should be a medium by which technology is dis-
seminated among people; he has stated that it is Ichi's 1叫eto share the innovations of J apa-
nese technology with people from al over the world. Ichi has engaged in collaborations and 
invested substantial time and money into producing materials to distinguish the Ichi brand; 
Ichi clothing is now made with innovative materia1s. In this， itmay be perceived how Ichi 
has strategically taken its status as a J apanese company as an advantage. 
Ichi expanded into overseas markets because of a strong sense of crisis awareness. In 
his biography， Sakai describes himself as a short， weak J apanese man compared to West-
erners; he discusses how he strove to position his company in the West， where chain store 
management deve10pment had far outpaced what was happening in J apan. Comparing J apan 
to the West， Sakai felt a sense of inferiority that extended to beyond marketing. This moti-
vated him to open stores overseas-after opening a first store in the UK， he opened global 
f1agships in New York， Paris， and other cities in the West. Meanwhile， the company began to 
proactively expand its business to Asian markets one year after opening in the UK. 
To become a real global company， Ichi has also paid attention to internationalizing its 
human resources management. Sakai has stressed on many occasions that it is critical for 
Japanese to go abroad; consequently， Ichi has sent hundreds of Japanese managers to over-
seas markets to recr・uitlargely foreign employees. These business practices evidence Ichi's 
eagerness to expand its overseas business. 
It can be concluded i云omthe above that， based on the principles of its founder， Ichi has 
pursued rapid growth overseas and transformed its business practices both to adapt to the 
market and to make its status as a J apanese company an advantage. While clear traces of 
the development of Ichi's corporate ideology are lacking in its early history， the company's 
ideology is visib1e in its expansion into the Hong Kong market. 
Corporate ideology and Ichi DNA 
The word “D NA" has been used in Ichi' s of主cialannual reports since 2006， when Sakai 
indicated that the company's high-quality products were the result of its “Japanese DNA." 
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Corporate ideology 
lchi D災A
Figure 1 Ichi's corporate ideology 
“DNA" refers to the inherited， unchangeable genetic nature and traits of an organism. At 
Ichi， the term“DNA" refers to the company's ideology， which employees can "inherザ， as 
part of the genetic identity of the company. The concept of Ichi DNA came from the com-
pany's ]apanese headquarters; it reflects both uniquely ]apanese aspects and the distinct 
company ideology. 
This paper focuses on the core principle of Ichi's corporate ideology-冶lobalOne."
Global One was instituted as a policy to standardize the Ichi ideology worldwide. To clariiy 
this concept， this paper focuses on two major・principles:that sales must be increased and 
that] apanese-style customer service must be provided (see Figure 1). 
The Global One concept is closely linked with the company's failure in the UK and 
mainland China and its success in Hong Kong. When Ichi entered the UK and mainland 
China markets in 2002 and 2003， respectively， the company was uncertain whether its way 
of doing business would work oveγseas. Ichi believed that local employees with more knowl-
edge of the local market should be responsible for business operations; however， the com-
pany was not able to turn a p1・ofitfor the next several years. When the company had almost 
lost its faith， a miracle happened in Hong Kong-on opening day， a large number of custom-
ers lined up and profits completely unexpected among top management were earned. 
After its success in Hong Kong， Ichi came to believe that its ideology could be a key 
factor in whether it would be able to succeed overseas; the company has thus sought to dis-
seminate this ideology worldwide. The two major principles of Ichi's ideology-that sales 
must be increased and that ] apanese-style customer service must be provided-are ex-
plained in the following section. 
jα仰悦sehostitαlity: Customer satisjaction 
Many studies have criticized ] apanese companies for failing to establish“]apanese" 
brand images in overseas markets (Sakaguchi 2010; Shimada 2011). However， Ichi has in-
stituted ] apanese-style customer service to ensure Ichiもpeci主ccustomer satisfaction. Ichi' s 
St01・esin every overseas mar・ketuse a standardized customer service manual; understand-
ing the customer service manual is a major criterion for promotion. 
Ichi has strongly emphasized customer service: customers who are satisfied are likely 
to buy m01届e，increasing sales. Consequently， Ichi expects employees to ensure high levels 
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of customer service. As part of the Global One policy， Ichi has formulated a list of standard 
customer service requirements. According to the company， employees in any region or 
country can ensure higher levels of customer satisfaction by abiding by the requirements. 
There are two characteristics to Ichi's customer service principles. First， customer 
service is supposed to link Ichi with “J apanese" culture. Customers consider politeness， 
smiles， and sensitivity the major featur・esof J apanese hospitality. For Reisinger and Turner 
(1999:1221)， politeness is an ideological aspect of Japanese culture by which， through the 
expression of a decent manner， people attempt to avoid public conflict. Ichi also established 
a 1日is坑tof 
the 1日is坑tincludes not only i泊napprop戸ri泊atebehavior toward customers but also woωrds that 
should not be used. These characteristics could be considered to have emerged from J a-
pan's shame-based cultur・e.According to Takie L三bra(1983: 194)， J apanese culture is distin-
guished by a sensitivity to superficial shame and embarrassment‘To avoid behaviors that 
could“shame" the company， store employees are required to practice good behavior. 
Second， the company has indicated that customer service can be evaluated by “immedi-
ate evaluation" -in other words， that an evaluator could determine an employee's custom-
er service performance immediately upon observing it. Therefore， many employees seeking 
promotion have basically followed the manual rather than serve customers with their own 
interpretation of hospitality. 
Third， several concepts in the manual are ambiguously de負nedand subject to individual 
inter・pretation.For example， the manual uses the terms“smile，"“polite，" and“inappropriate 
words，" but these terms could be interpreted differently by different people. The manual 
lists “inappropriate words，" but in fact， whether words are inappropriate is situation-depen-
dent. 
In addition to enhancing its Japanese characteristics， Ichi is concerned with pl・ofitmak-
ing; thus， it places an emphasis on increasing sales. This notion is explained in the following 
section. 
Sales meαηωeγythiηg: The compαnyαsαpγojit-mαkiηgorg，αnizαtioη 
Ichi has attempted to distinguish its brand from others by providing unique， ]apanese-
style customer service. Sales are also crucial; this paper practically understands increases in 
sales as having resulted from business strategies to increase store sales pertaining to store 
layouts， efficiently managing stock control， and so on. 
As the founder of Ichi， Sakai has repeatedly announced in the media that J apanese 
should not dream of becoming salarymen， who in Sakai's estimation are less motivated， 
less innovative， and less able to achieve; 1・抗her，he has exhorted people to pursue a spirit of 
mercantilism. As mentioned previously， Sakai's persistent crisis awareness spurred him to 
pursue continual development for the company at a rate rapid enough to gain the dominant 
market position. 
This focus on continual development can be observed in Ichi's resu1ts-based promo-
tion system， under which people who achieve strong results are promoted without an eye 
to their age or sex. On its oficial recruitment website， Ichi presents numerous examples of 
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young employees in their・20sand 30s who were promoted at the beginning of theiI・careers.
Ichi has also promoted its initiatives to give young people the opportunity to work overseas. 
In one interview the company has posted online， a young female store manager discusses 
having been sent overseas in the second year of her career. 
Ichi holds recruitment events on various occasions. During these recruitment events， 
members of the human resources department show movie clips and discuss how the re-
sults同basedpromotion system has enabled young staff members to gain valuable experience 
at Ichi. Furthermore， itis emphasized during these events that the company appreciates 
good talent and can fast-track fresh university graduates to store l11anager positions. 
Fieldwork at Ichi Hong Kong suggested that there was a gap between the company's 
statel11ents and reality. However， itwas deterl11ined that employees who were able to in-
Cl・easesales at stores were highly evaluated and were promoted even at the beginning of 
their careers. This principle has been practiced both in Hong Kong and J apan. 
Ichi defined and rede白ledits corporate ideology and， based on the Global One initia-
tive， sought to introduce this ideology overseas. The following section shifts the focus to 
Hong Kong to illustrate how Ichi's corporate ideology has gradually been disseminated in 
three stages. 
Ichi Hong Kong 
By June 2015， there were 24 stores in Hong Kong. The first store in Hong Kong， Mira-
mar， opened in September 2005. In the 2007 fiscal year， three stores opened， and four more 
opened in the 2008 fiscal year. By the end of August 2007， the company had earned HK$1.8 
billion， including operating profits of HK$46 l11ilion. The number of new stores dropped 
frOl11 four to two， with the peak in fiscal year 2008. In fiscal year 2011， the COl11pany started 
to convert its standardized stores into large-scale ones5l ， such as the Telford Plaza store and 
the Harbor City store. From 2012， the company continuously opened the stores particularly 
targeting the loca1l11iddle class and l11ainland Chinese tourists. 
This paper wil examine the changes of Ichi Hong Kong's development frol11 three 
stages: laissez-faire principle (2005 to 2007)， Il11plementation of the Ichi DNA and the “Global 
One" Policy (2008 to 2010) and Enhancement of DNA in the Mature Stage (2011 and on-
wards). 
laissez-faire Principle: 2005・2007
One of the major factors in Ichi's early success was the l11arket situation， such as the 
location strate幻T，and the cOl11pany' s brand building in an a仕emptto attract customers with 
a “Made in J apan" image. After・thesuccess of the first store， the local subsidiary opened 
seven new stores in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. The company's location strategy was to tar-
get more mainland Chinese tourists. For instance， the metro station near the Festival Walk 
store， inKowloon Tong， ison the East Rail Line， which connects directly to mainland China. 
Because of the emphasis on increasing the number of store openings， necessary ad-
5) Standardized stores are around 750 m2 while large-scale ones are around 1，500 m2 to 3，000 nl 
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justments to human resource policies and management principles were neglected， and the 
company did not have enough time to introduce much of the “Global One" standardization， 
which is why this paper describes this phase as "laissez司.faire."Local and ]apanese Store 
Managers were also busy managing store operations and recruiting new employees to keep 
up with the high turnover rate. A quote from Mr. Mizuno， an Operations Manager who was 
relocated to Hong Kong in 2008， can help us understand the situation: 
1 am notjudging the ]apanese person in charge who worked in Hong Kong before my 
assignment， but there was no system at that time. There were so many customers every 
day that employees could only care about replenishment without any standardized rules 
or systems. Moreover， there was no systematic evaluation system， so the resignation 
rate was serious. The first store in Hong Kong gained huge success， so the subsidiary 
was expected to open more stores. When 1 ar・rivedhere， 1 found that it was completely 
“uncontrolled" (nobanashi). Wheη1 went to the store， 1 found no sign of Ichi's basic 
principles. The ]apanese person in charge looked so tired that he looked like he was 
clying. 
Thus， the local employees experienced an“uncontrolled" situation. One full-timer who 
worked at the East Point City (TKO) store from its opening in 2007 said，“We didn't have 
any 'lchi' rules before. We just learnt the skills that are required to operate the store. I've 
heard that our company has some kind of principles， but we don't have to memorize or cho-
rus them." A parιtimer at the TKO store agreed with the full-timer by saying that she liked 
working in lchi when there were no“sily" rules. 
Implementation of註leIchi DNA and the “Global One" Policy: 2008回2010
The laissez-faire policy did not last for long time. From 2008， the lchi DNA was in-
troduced to increase pl・ofitsand unify brand image to an lchi kijun (standard) while also 
standardizing floor layout and CS. The Hong Kong subsidiary's first major change was the 
introduction and standardization of the lchi DNA， focusing on kijuηand CS under the “Global 
One" policy. Mizuno stressed the necessity of using the DNA to differentiate lchi from oth-
ers by referring to the company's failure in the U.K.: 
The major reason for Ichi's failure in U.K. was the complete localization. The 
company recruitecl local employees as top management and practicecl in local ways. 
However， itclidn't work out well. We failecl to sencl the message about the gooclness of 
] apanese companies， and what we coulcl offer as a ] apanese organization. At the time， 
customers only regarded us as an Asian company that solcl affordable proclucts. 1n the 
beginning， some customers might have been interestecl in our company， but we failecl to 
clifferentiate ourselves. Then， we introduced them to our strengths， what we achieved as 
a J apanese company， ancl the funclamental principles that lecl to our success. Those are 
the major reasons for our success in託ongKong・anclKorea. The price of the proclucts 
actually does not matter that much nowaclays， since many companies are doing the same 
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thing. ¥Ve need to show our high value through our attitudes towards work and display 
the company's DNA tocustomers; otherwise， we wi1 not differentiate our company from 
others. 
Additional shop floor・standardsfor employees to follow were added to the company's 
manuals. Through“Global One"， many new standards were introduced to the Hong Kong 
stores on issues such as price pop locations， store layout， and the order of products in order 
to provide a unified shop f100r to customers. A standardized CS Check Sheet was formu-
lated， and employees were evaluated daily by their highel・1・ankedemployees on their polite-
ness and hospitality; CS became a more important factor in promotions. The introduction of 
these requir・ementsalso became part of the standardization of the “Global One" policy. 
The second change was from“showcase" stores to high-volume sales stores. Although 
the Hong Kong store is much smaller than the J apanese ones， they al sel1 the same num-
ber of products. According to Mizuno， when Ichi anかedin Hong Kong， the sales floor was 
designed to build a brand image that attracted customers. To do this， the store set aside 
a large space near the entrance for many mannequins. Mizuno strongly favored this strat-
egy. However， he believed that， asthe Ichi brand was now recognized by many Hong Kong 
customers， itmight be time to create a sales floor geared more to customer satisfaction， as
customers had started to complain about the lack of different sizes and colors. To do this， 
Mizuno believed it necessary to place more products within the limited space. In the end of 
2009， Mizuno felt that the sales f100r needed to be changed. Mizuno asked a Japanese Visual 
Merchandising Displayれ札1D)team to come to Hong Kong， renew the floor plan， and in句
stalllarger product shelves for the 2010 autumn winter peak season. For instance， the TKO 
store had only small product shelves. Starting in mid 2010， Mizuno regular1y visited the 
store with the Supervisor; in September 2010， a number of large tal product shelves were 
delivered to the store and these were able to contain more products.明Tithlarger products 
shelves， the store' s inventory sharply increased. 
This change intends to increase the sales since its development was slower than in 
the ear1y days. Ichi believed that a systemic rationalization was necessary to reduce costs 
as much as possible， which meant that the stores' major task was to reduce costs and in地
Cl・easesales based on the standardized policy rather than implementing local solutions. For 
instance， Ichi followed the part-timer focused model in J apan in order to assign employees 
f1exibly and reduce costs. Although this model was not workable and many Store Manager 
suggested changing this policy， ithas not been changed for more than白veyears. 
The above practice might not directly contribute to the increase of sales in Hong Kong; 
however， the company continuously stressed the implementation of its DNA. 
Enhancement of DNA in the Mature Stage: 2011-
As the company never stopped expecting higher profit， a breakthrough after 1・e-opening
stores as larger ones and opening the f1agship store turned out to be necessary. The trans-
fer of J apanese Store Managers was also expected to increase sales， given their deep knowl-
edge of the Ichi DNA， which had contributed strongly to sales in Japan. Around the same 
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time， the company attempted to introduce a monthly CS checkup to enhance lchi's brand 
lmage. 
The changes of store formats and the transfer of ] apanese expatriates were expected 
to help stimulate revenue. Two standard sized stores， the Harbor City and Telford Plaza 
stores， were relocated and re-opened as larger stores. The Telford Plaza store was the larg-
est in Hong Kong when it opened. Mizuno said that enlarging the store would have been an 
ef五cientway of increasing its net revenue， but that its limited retail space and high rent pre-
vented this. Another breakthr・oughwas made in Hong Kong with the flagship store. Before 
the store opened， Mizuno "predicted" in an interview that it would be necessary to promote 
the presence of lchi again: 
1 think a breakthrough is crucial for the Hong Kong operation in the near future. 
There are large apparel retailers， such as H&M， ZAI~ and GAP， inHong Kong. 
Moreover， the Hong Kong market has already maturecl， and customers have higher 
requirements. 1 am sure Ichi has a position in the market， but we neecl to have another 
breakthrough in orcler to win against those leading apparel retailers. A flagship could 
have that impact and allow Hong Kong's people to see the potential of Ichi. We are going 
to open such a store in the near釦ture.6)
It is not possible to maintain annual sales since Ichi employees regard mere 
maintenance as a backward move. Therefore， we must exceed the annual sales of the 
previous year. Even though we are entering the mature stage， we have to brush up on 
our operations.7) 
Besides securing the annual sales gr・owth，the company did not neglect to implement its 
corporate ideology in Hong Kong. The lchi DNA was enhanced in Hong Kong through the 
transfer of seven ]apanese Store Managers in early 2011， who were assigned to train local 
Store Managers based on the “original" lchi DNA to achieve higher cost performance and 
profits. Most had long experience working at lchi. Before their arrival， a1]apanese employ-
ees were ranked above the Store Managers， increasing the number of J apanese expatriates 
from three to ten. While working next to them， the ] apanese Store Managers were xpected 
to provide detailed training. 
One of the strategies to uniiy lchi brand image was the Apri12011 introduction of the CS 
Checkup， performed by a mystery shopper企ommainland China. This practice was intro-
duced into the Hong Kong market because of its effectiveness in improving CS in mainland 
China. According to an informant who worked in mainland China， CS in Hong Kong was not 
checked unti12010， when ]apanese top managers were shocked at its low level. 
The above practices were attempts to enhance sales and build lchi's brand image. The 
changes to the store's format and the enhancements to lchi's DNA were consequences of 
the low sales of Hong Kong stores， which the company believed were caused by a lack of 
6) Interview with Mizuno on September 25，2010. 
7) Interview with Mizuno on January 14， 2011. 
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lchi DNA; they believed it crucial to introduce a systern that was more efficient. Japanese 
Store Managers were sent to Hong Kong to enhance the lchi DNA throug・htheir daily su馳
pervision of the stores， while CS checkups were used to improve CS and unify the company 
lmage. 
From the discussion of three different stages of lchi Hong Kong， itis clear that the 
company has gradually introduced Ichi ideology and employees were required to adapt to 
this change in order to facilitate their career path. In order to facilitate its introduction， the 
company expected store managers to play the role as“missionary円 tospread this idea. This 
is supported by the design of the company structure， which transferred authority to store 
managers who were considered to be the experts on store operation. 
The next section wil introduce the stories of two store managers at TKO store to ana-
lyze how their interpretations towards corporate ideology have resulted in transforming hu-
man relations. 
Store managers and corporate ideology 
The TKO store opened in a shopping mall on the east side of Hong Kong in 2007. The 
mall is located in a new town in southern Kowloon Island. The store targets local， middle-
class residents and is located in a mall with many other retailers， including Lafuma， Cotton 
On， The Body Shop， Chow Sang Sang， and Marks & Spencer. The store employs between 
30 and 60 employees， including part-timers， depending on the season. Data were obtained 
from fieldwork conducted between 2010 and 2011. During the白eldworkperiod， with the ex-
ception of an assistant store manager who was transferred to another store， the employees 
at the TKO store (overseen by the store managers “Jenny" and “Lisa") remained the same. 
The TKO store has been criticized by the head office for its low levels of customer 
satisfaction and lower sales; every successive store manager has sought to rectiちTthese 
problems. This paper examines two store managers; in the following， their career paths at 
Ichi (Table 1) J which have to some extent influenced their interpretation of the corporate 
ideology， are illustrated. 
The fir・ststore manager， Jenny， joined Ichi after working at a Hong Kong fashion retailer 
for several years. She worked at the TKO store from March 2010 to February 2011. The 
Tab1e 1 Two store managers at the TKO store (2007-2012) 
Year of 
Name Birth Sex NationaHty Eclucation Á_~:::._~Á Previous job 
entry 
Hong Kong 
Jenny 1977 F Hong Kong High schoo1 2007 一一fashion retai1er 
Entry ranl王
Career deve10pment 
in Hong Kong 
L Sep 2007-Feb 2010: LT 
Senior 2. Mar 2010ヂeb2011: TKO 
Sa1esperson 3. Mar 2011-Aug 2012: OC 
1. Sep 2007-Aug 2008: TP 
2. Sep 2008-Feb 2009: PH 
Lisa 1982 F Hong Kong High scho01 2007 Indepenclent Ful1抱time 3. Mar 2009-Aug 2010: WTC 
business Sa1esperson 4. Sep 2010蜘Feb2011: NTP 
5. Mar 2011-Aug 2011: TKO 
6. Sep 2011-: NTP 
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second store manageにLisa，joined the company after operating her own fashion business. 
She worked at the TKO store after Jenny left in February 2011. Before coming to the TKO 
store， neither J enny nor Lisa had worked as store managers previously. 
J enny and Lisa made decisions differently due to several factors. First， J enny and Lisa 
entered Ichi at different levels. Because she had had experience W01・kingat a fashion re-
tailer as a senior salesperson， Jenny was able to enter Ichi one rank above Lisa， who entered 
as a ful鋤timesalesperson， the lowest entry level for ful1-timers.8) Second， whereas J enny 
worked at three stores， Lisa worked at six. Although it was not formally stated， store manag-
ers who had worked at a large number of stores wel・econsidered to have more expertise 
and a brighter future at the company. 
The following sections examine how different interpretations of the corporate ideol-
ogy-including its principles in regard to increasing sales and the provision of customer 
service-gave rise to dynamic， complex human relations at the TKO store. 
Customer service lover: J enny 
Based on a strong recommendation from her local supervisor， J enny took and passed 
Ichi's store manager examination， though she viewed the promotion to store managel・with
reluctance. From her point of view， store managers had heavy workloads; she wanted to 
avoid long working hours so that she could have more free time. Despite her trepidation 
regarding her supervisor's recommendation， she eventually took the examination based on 
her understanding that Ichi employees should continually seek improvement rather than 
stay in the same position. FurthermOl・e，she liked her local supervisor and believed that a 
promotion could bene五thel・interms of her future career. 
Jenny interpreted Ichi's ideology as favoring her persona1 career path. Furthermore， 
she believed that store managers only needed to either improve customer service or i仔
crease sales. She chose to focus more on customer service because she had less confidence 
that she could improve sales. As she had capable subordinates and almost every store In 
Hong Kong had achieved successively higher sales on an annual basis， Jenny was able to 
secure her position by focusing on1y on customer service. The following section discusses 
how Jenny's interpretation of the corporate ideology gave rise to a“harmonious" store. 
A focus on customeγseγvzceγαtheγthαれ O筑間cγeαsingsαles 
Jenny's first strategy was to demonstrate the customer service model herself on the 
shop flor. When 1 first saw her provide customer service for the first time， 1 thought she 
was very“J apanese-style" in terms of her politeness and natural smile. Discussing the issue 
of customer service with J enny over lunch， she said that modeling customer service was 
necessary， as it was quite hard to educate and change the mindsets of employees who had 
worked at a single store for relatively long time. In addition to demonstrating “standard" 
8) Before 2010， Ichi had no rank between the positions of full-time sa1esperson and senior sa1esperson; thus， at
the time they started working， Jenny was on1y one rank higher than Lisa. Since then， Ichi has introduced the 
position of advanced salesperson between these two positions. 
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customer service performance for the store employees， she also had a different s廿ategy.
Jenny's second strategy was to change her・attitudetowards store employees based on 
their customer service performance. For instance， Jenny treated two full-time salespeople 
with a kind attitude and frequently socialized with them outside of work because they were 
able to perform the customer service J enny desired. Furthermore， she praised them in 
front of others and assigned them to manage customer service teams， although such teams 
were only supposed to be managed by employees who were advanced salespeople or high-
er. 
By contrast， she publicly criticized employees who did not practice customer service to 
her expectations. One長Ill-timesalesperson， Oliver， displayed a recalcitrant attitude towards 
J enny， who often directed him to follow the Ichi manual and smile at customers on the shop 
flor. After several tries at getting Oliver to smile， Jenny began to avoid assigning him to 
work on the shop floor in front of customers. Ther・ewere many times that 1 witnessed Oliver 
working in the back room and the alteration room. Susan， a part-time employee， can serve 
as another representative example. Susan was an experienced staff member with numer-
ous skils; however， customers twice complained that she had an inappropriate attitude and 
a“poker face." She was reluctant to smile because she found it hard to smile at strangers， 
even though her workplace required it. To prevent customer complaints from damaging the 
store and her own reputation， Jenny avoided assigning Susan to locations in the store that 
were PI・oneto a higher rate of customer complaints， such as the cash register and fitting 
room. 
The extent of the relationship between customer service performance and employee 
pr・omotion，such that J enny directed such substantial efforts to it， isexemplified in the case 
of Sabrina. Sabrina， who was in her early 20s， had worked at the TKO store since its opening 
in 2007. She was the oldest and most experienced staff member at the TKO store; however， 
by 2010， she had not been promoted for over three years， which was unusual at Ichi at the 
time. My first impression of Sabrina was that she was expert at every task but did not smile 
while on the shop floor-though she was physically able to smile， she did not find it neces-
sary to smile at customers. In her words，仙Thereis no direct relationship between whether 
1 smile and sales， right? Many managers claim that it is necessary to smile to attract more 
customers， but 1 haven't seen any scientific proof." She believed that if a person had a“real" 
ability to do their jobs， they would eventually be promoted. However， after working at the 
TKO store for three years without being promoted， she realized that there was something 
wrong with her idea. 
Sabrina's was finally promoted because in the eyes of the supervisor who was ranked 
above store manager and was responsible for the TKO store， her customer service perfor-
mance had improved. This supervisor had originally rejected the store manager's recom-
mendation that Sabrina be promoted on the gr・oundsthat her customer service performance 
was inadequate. The former・deputystore manager advised her that customer service is one 
of the most important criteria for promotion at Ichi and that she could not underestimate 
its significance. Moreover， the former deputy store manager pointed out that ignoring her 
supervisor when he came to the store was inappr刀priate;to give him a better impression， it
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was recommended that Sabrina voluntarily greet to her supervisor. Sabrina indicated that 
she forced herself to smile on the shop floor and greeted her supervisor with a natural smile 
for the following months. Even she did it unwillingly， this advice worked well for her and the 
supervisor finally gave his approval for her promotion. Sabrina commented that her promo-
tion could entirely be ascribed to her customer service performance， as she had not learned 
any new jobs. 
Sabrina's case evidences Jenny's emphasis on customer service. Jenny found it difficult 
to look after both customer service and sales; consequently， she handed responsibility for 
sales to her capable subordinates， particularly Michelle， the deputy store manager， and 
Kelvin， a senior salesperson. In addition to Michelle and Kelvin， Jenny also passed tasks 
to Gina， an assistant store manager who had joined Ichi fresh out of college and had been 
promoted to her position three monthsばterjoining the company.9l However， J enny rarely 
assigned more important managerial tasks to Gina because she found training Gina a waste 
of time. After Michelle le立， authority over sales issues was largely transferred to Kelvin 
because Gina was inadequate at her job and distrusted by Jenny. Michelle's relocation in-
creased Kelvin's power and status at the store; it was he who ful五lledstore manager duties 
when J enny was not around， although Gina ranked higher than him. 
‘!日αγγnonious})stoγe 
These descriptions may suggest that J enny' s managerial practices resulted in an unhar-
monious atmosphere at the TKO store. However， inreality， the turnover rate was low and 
human relations were quite harmonious compared to other stores. 
Jenny's way of treating employees differently according to their customer service 
performance did not create conflicts belween her and her subordinates because most em-
ployees understood that the store manager had substantial power in regard to personnel ar-
rangement. Even employees who had been treated， intheir words，“unfairly，" did not rebel 
againstJenny in an obvious way. 1 did not encounter any public conflicts between Jenny and 
her subordinates during my fieldwork. Jenny attempted to build harmonious relationships 
with al1 of her subordinates， atleast in a superficial way， toensure that she could obtain help 
from them when necessary. 
Furthermore， no direct conflicts between those who were favored by the store manag-
ers and the others emerged because among them， there were no clear conflicts of interest. 
Even employees who were treated “well" by the store manager did not get the promotions 
or transfers to different stores that they wanted. Therefore， employees who were not J en-
ny's favOI・itesdid not feel threatened by the existence of favorites. Moreover， employees did 
not seriously consider customer service as important as sales. Sabrina had dif白cultiesgeι 
ting promoted because of her・customerservice performance， despite the fact that she was 
qualified in terms of sales. Her case also emphasizes the fact that while employees seeking 
9) The company has emphasized the importance of hiring educated university graduates， who it considers futul・e
candidates for store managers. Such graduates typically enter the company three ranks above other Full-time 
Salespeople. 
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to improve their customer service performance could simply follow a manual， those seeking 
to enhance their sales performance could not do so without accumulating actual experience. 
It may be suggested that the TKO store had “har・monious"relations because motivation was 
limited and career goals were ambiguous among the employees. 
Employees did not object when Kelvin， a senior salesperson， came to have more power 
over store issues than Gina， who as assistant store manager was supposed to have that pow-
er. Many employees believed that Kelvin was more capable than either Gina or even J enny. 
Furthermore， Kelvin was very careful to maintain human relations with other employees 
and attempted to avoid conflict as much as possible so that he could obtain help when nec四
essa1'y. 
As these observations clearly indicate， J enny's st1'ong expectation of stability and her・
own inte1'pretation of the Ichi ideology unexpectedly and spontaneously gave 1'ise to a “ha子
monious" sto1'e. Employees c1'iticized J enny fo1' not offering p1'omotional oppo1'tunities. The 
next sto1'e manage1'， Lisa， actually offered p1'omotional opportunities; however， Lisa's sub-
stantial emphasis on sales led to d1'astic changes in human 1'elations at the TKO sto1'e. 
Sales only: Store Manager Lisa 
Lisa， the youngest Ichi store manage1'， did not have a unive1'sity deg1'ee. Afte1' giving 
bi1'th to he1' second child， Lisa opted to work at Ichi because she wanted mo1'e stability and 
to spend mo1'e time with her family. 
In cont1'ast to Jenny， who paid litle attention to sales， Lisa emphasized sales and the 
pr・omotionof subo1'dinates. She la1'gely ignored custome1' service. When Lisa ar1'ived at the 
TKO sto1'e inMa1'ch 2011， many employees immediately noticed that she was diffe1'ent f1・om
J enny: while Lisa often wo1'ked on the shop floo1'， J enny had not. Lisa only wo1'ked at the 
TKO store f01局 halfa yea1'; howeve1'， she exerted a strong influence on the powe1' st1'uctUI・e
among he1' subo1'dinates and t1'ansfo1'med the sto1'e atmosphere that Jenny had facilitated. 
Focus on salesαγzd the pγomotion 01 suboγdinαtes 
Lisa mainly focused on improvements to the shop floor， such as improvements to the 
layout and stock control; this was because she believed， based on he1' own experience， that 
the shop floor was mo1'e important than customer service. Lisa told me p1'oudly that al-
though she had wo1'ked with many store manage1's， he1' achievements we1'e the 1'esult of he1' 
own effo1'ts 1'athe1' than f1'om t1'aining received from store managers. She also highlighted 
he1' love of managing stock cont1'ol and making sto1'e layouts. Lisa was 1'ich in sales experi-
ence but paid nearly no attention to customer se1'vice perfo1'mance; in half a yea1' of pa1'tici-
pant observation， 1 did not see he1' smile at a custome1' once. 
In pursuit of attractive store layouts， Lisa made frequent adjustments that she 1'equi1'ed 
subordinates to car1'y out. One day， Lisa came toward me and looked at a display. She asked 
me to switch the color・ofthe display because she thought it was unatt1'active; she asked me 
to hurry. It was the fir・sttime 1 had received an o1'de1' from the store manager 1'egarding the 
shop floor-Jenny had delegated such matters to her subo1'dinates. Lisa frequently asked 
employees to change the clothing on mannequins and to reo1'ganize shelves to at1'act mo1'e 
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customers. 1n contrast to J enny， Lisa carefully examined the sales floor in order to increase 
sales. Many employees were impressed by Lisa's performance and regarded her as a model 
store manager. 
1n contrast to J enny， Lisa allowed more full-time employees to be promoted. Lisa wanted 
to promote as many employees as possible; she would ask supervisors whether positions at 
other stores were available for her part四timeemployees to transfer・toas full-time salespeo-
ple. Lisa conducted monthly face-to-face interviews with store employees to learn what her 
subordinates wanted and she tried her best to help them. Lisa aggressively tried to promote 
subordinates and facilitate store transfers. These efforts were largely based on her own 
career path: she believed that employees who received promotions and transferred stores 
could acquire more experience that would eventually contribute to their sales performance. 
From her point of view， the ability to inc1'ease sales was premised on the accumulation of 
expe1'ience; she did not believe custome1' se1'vice performance requi1'ed experience. 
Lisa put her effo1'ts into sales and the promotion of subordinates. She did not institute 
custome1' service requi1'ements fo1' employees except fo1' those 1'equi1'ed by he1' supe1'viso1'， 
and even then， she expended litle effort in enforcement. 1n 1'esponse to pressure from her 
supe1'viso1'， she for・meda custome1' service team and assigned seve1'al full-time employees to 
look afte1' customer se1'vice p1'actices among employees， but she paid litle attention to it. 
Thanks to hel・ha1'dwo1'k in 1'ega1'd to increasing sales and p1'omoting subo1'dinates， 
Lisa gained he1' employees' t1'ust and enhanced their motivation. Many employees d1'eamed 
of a b1'ight future and sta1'ted to spend more time learning st1'ategies to increase sales in or-
der to be recommended by Lisa for promotion; however， this led to power struggles among 
motivated employees and created an unharmonious store atmosphere. 
PO叩eγstγugglesαndαnunharmoniousαtmosPheγe 
Two major types of conflict at the TKO store emerged: conflicts among full-timers and 
conflicts between ful-tImers and part-time1's. 
The conflict between Gina， the assistant sto1'e manage1'， and Roy， a full-time salespe1'son， 
is 1・epresentativeof the conflicts that emerged among full-timers. Under J enny， Gina had not 
been assigned managerial tasks; accordingly， she was considered low in status and to have 
li社lepower. However， when Lisa became the new store manager， Lisa expected Gina to pe1'-
form appropriately in her role as assistant store manager and assigned her various manage-
rial tasks. With her growing responsibility for managerial tasks， Gina sought more power 
and an enhanced status. Gina believed that as a manager， he1' majo1' task was to manage sub-句
ordinates-in another words， togive orders rather than obey them. Even Gina believed that 
she had insufficient experience; however， she felt that holding a university diploma gave her 
a certain privilege at Ichi. Ichi allows university graduates to enter the company three ranks 
above the lowest ranked position， full-time salesperson. She distinguished herself from 
othel舟 employeesbased on her higher education and English ability. As Lisa assigned her an 
increasing number of managerial tasks， Gina began to enhance the presentation of her own 
power and status. However， Gina's insufficient experience and “elegant" attitude caused 
many conflicts with other employees. 
18 
Corporate ideology and store managers: Implication fTom a ]apanese retailer 
Roy， a full-time salesperson in his early 20s， worked at several fashion retailers after 
graduating from high school. Roy had given up pursuing his dream to become a firefighter 
or police officer after failing certification examinations several times; subsequently， he made 
up his mind to attempt to obtain a better position at Ichi. Roy was good at customer service， 
which had made him Jenny's favorite， although he felt insecure about his limited sales expe-
rience and his lack of training in regard to sales. 
As she assigned Gina various managerial tasks， Lisa also gave Roy many opportunities 
to handle sales issues-she tasked him with making the store layout and learning about 
stock control， among other things. Both Gina and Roy were beginners at sales-related opera-
tions and both were eager to show the store manager that they were capable of achievement 
in order to be recommended for promotion. 
Previously， under J enny， Roy and Gina had had a harmonious relationship; they had 
been rather like equals despite the fact that Gina was four ranks higher than Roy. By as-
signing more managerial tasks to Gina， Lisa changed the relationship between Gina and 
Roy: while they had previously been relatively equal， their relationship became one with a 
superior-inferior dynamic as Gina was given more opportunities to give orders to employ-
ees， including Roy. Suddenly， Roy was confronted with a“bossy" version of Gina. Roy tried 
to be calm and to ignore Gina and focus on his work， whereas Gina began to target what she 
perceived as Roy' s inadequacy at work. 
In December 2010， Roy and Gina were scheduled to meet with the store manager. Be-
fore the meeting， Roy saw Gina on the shop floor but did not greet her. Gina tapped him on 
the shoulder and said，“Hey， are you sick today?" The phrase itself did not sound serious. 
However， out of his fatigue and long-term stress with Gina， Roy exploded; in front of custom-
ers， he told her “F-you" in Cantonese. Gina was shocked: she had not predicted Roy， with 
his mild temper， tosay such words. She ran to Lisa to relay the incident. Lisa found Roy and 
told him that they needed to tal王，though they did not tal王onthat day due to business at the 
store. Several days later， Gina and Roy encountered each other in the back room after their 
shifts. Gina confronted Roy and said she wanted to discuss and resolve their problems; Roy 
told her he did not want to talk to her. Roy told me that on that day， he used extremely dirty 
words with Gina to get her to leave him alone. After several weeks， Roy gave up白ghting
with Gina and apologized. This incident seriously damaged Roy and Gina's relationship and 
contributed to the creation of an unharmonious atmosphere. 
The conflict between Anna， a new part-timer， and J anet， an advanced salesperson， is
representative of the conflicts that emerged between full-timers and part-timers. J anet had 
substantial experience working at Ichi and was Jenny's successor insofar as she sought to 
praise capable staff members and scold those she found incompetent. J anet had a particu-
larly grudging attitude towards new part-timers: she found that many of them were unmoti-
vated and that training them occupied a large amount of her time. Anna， a university student 
who had just started working at the Ichi store， had a direct conflict with J anet. One day， 
during an employee meeting， Anna forgot to bring a document. According to Anna， J anet 
embarrassed her by scolding her repeatedly for forgetting to bring the document in front 
of other employees. Furious at J anet， Anna smashed the plastic bottle on a table and left the 
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room. 1 was working in the back room when 1 saw Anna come in. With tears running down 
her face， she told me that Janet had often tried to humiliate her. On many occasions， 1 ob-
served new part二-timershaving direct or indirect conflicts with full-timers. 
京市en1 heard the story from Anna， 1 was not surprised. 1 had observed Janet for・halfa 
year and had found her hostile towards new part-timers; 1 ascribed her hostility to the fact 
that stress at the store had increased since Lisa had taken over. It cannot simply be con-
cluded that Lisa's management was directly responsible for this. Rather， Lisa's emphasis on 
sales instead of customer service exerted a substantial influence on how employees at the 
store behaved. Under Lisa， employees became more ambitious and eager to demonstrate 
their performance to secure promotions. Thus， mutual conflicts of interest emerged be-
tween them， exacerbated by Lisa's "unemotional" attitude toward her subordinates in com-
parison to J enny. 
Ichi ideology and s的remanagers 
Examining changes in human relations at the TKO store， itis clear that J enny and Lisa 
acted based on different interpretations of the corporate ideology and that these different 
interpretations differently influenced employee behavior and the store atmospher・e.Based 
on their career goals， J enny and Lisa developed differential interpr・etationsof two core prin-
ciples of the corporate ideology-that sales must be increased and that“J apanese-style" cus句
tOl11er service must be provided. Whereas J enny focused on customer service to secure her 
position， Lisa focused on sales. 
Under Jenny， human relations were largely influenced by her reluctance to promote 
subordinates. Jenny sought to retain her position in the company; her l11ajor strategy in this 
regarcl was to focus on custOl11er service in orcler・tohighlight her work performance to the 
cOl11pany. She neglected raining subordinates and increasing sales. HUl11an relations under 
Jenny were harmonious， although there were implicit conflicts between Jenny and her sub-
ordinates. 
Lisa was aggressive in regard to sales but neglected customer service ancl human rela-
tions within the store. This was because she believed that sales were the company's major 
concern and an important criterion for promotion. Uncler Lisa， relationships among employ-
ees were unharmonious; conflicts emerged among full-timers and between full-timers and 
part-timers. Many full-timers were highly motivated by Lisa's strong support fOl縄 pr・0l110ting
subordinates; however， the subsequent emergence of clear conflicts of interest spurred 
public conflicts among full-timers. Lisa's overemphasis on sales to the cletriment of human 
relations facilitated a detachment between Lisa and her subordinates; this contributed to the 
emergence of clirect conflicts between full-timers and part-timers. 
Jenny ancl Lisa's clifferent interpretations of the corporate ideology signi:ficantly influ-
enced human relations at the store. This shows that the role of store managers should not 
be underestimated: in terms of behavior and icleas， the store managers were influencecl by 
the corporate icleology， but they also negotiated and even rede:fined its meaning. 
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Condusion 
Using an anthropological approach， this paper・investigateda J apanese fashion retailer， 
Ichi， toexamine the formation of a corporate ideology and how different interpretations 
of this corporate ideology facilitated different human interactions. Its corporate ideology， 
which the company refers to as“Ichi DNA，" is inclusive of a system of meaning， beliefs， and 
values centered on the Global One concept， based on which the company has sought to dis姐
seminate a standardized Ichi ideology worldwide. This corporate ideology has been defined 
and redefined based on the strong and unique beliefs of the company's founder and the his-
torical development of the company over‘seas. Ichi's founder has emphasized that the com-
pany's Japanese DNA and rapid growth should be retained as its core principles. Con企onted
with undesirable results in the UK and mainland China， the company was unsure of the 
legitimacy of its cOl下orateideology. However， having made enormous profits in Hong Kong 
since the first year it opened stores based on the Ichi ideology， Ichi has exhibited a renewed 
con五dencein disseminating this idea to every one of its stores in the world. 
In the dissemination of the Ichi ideology， store managers serve as mediators between 
the company and stores. The Ichi ideology emphasizes two core pr・inciples:that sales must 
be increased and that“J apanese-style" customer service must be provided. This paper de聞
scribed in detail how two store managers who worked at the same store differently inter-
preted the Ichi ideology， giving rise to different human interactions. The first store manager， 
Jenny， focused on customer service because she had less con長dencein regard to sales and 
felt that it was unnecessary to pay attention to sales. She demonstrated standard customer 
service on the shop floor to become a model for others and treated employees differently 
according to their customer service performance. Though many employees complained 
about Jenny's managerial abilities， overall， human relations at the store were relatively har-
momous. 
When Lisa， the second store manager， took over from ] enny， this atmosphere gradually 
changed. Lisa focused on sales， paying nearly no attention to customer service， because she 
had become a store manager by using this strategy. Because Lisa believed that the ability to 
increase sales was premised on experience， she aggressively promoted subordinates and as-
signed them various tasks. This eventually gave rise to unharmonious relationships among 
motivated full-timers and between full-timers and part-timers. Conflicts of interest erupted 
among motivated full-timers because they did not want others to interfere with their work 
on tasks assigned by Lisa， for fear that they would lose out on chances to demonstr・atethat 
they were capable of achievement and to be recommended for promotion. Hostile attitudes 
among full-timers to some part-timers partially resulted from Lisa's neglect of al other is-
sues apart from increasing sales. 
This paper implies that corporate ideolo幻Tcannot be considered to absolutely dominate 
human interactions. At Ichi， the corporate ideology was disseminated but did not necessar-
ily become ingrained or unquestionable in the minds of employees. As Wong (1999:199) 
states，“power is culturally mediated and thus has differential effects on different groups of 
people." Consequently， itis important not to overemphasize the role of power; it is essential 
to consider how power is transmitted through culture and takes a distinct form in different 
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cultural contexts. In addition to the influence of corporate ideology， how conflicts of interest 
among employees influence company managerial practices should not be dismissed. 
Integrating one company through disseminating unified corporate ideology is not an 
easy task to accomplish; however， inthe context of Ichi， the store manager could be a key 
mediator for achieving this goal. In order to facilitate the progress of integration， the com-
pany should provide store managers more opportunities and comfortable space to discuss 
the problems the stores face. There were monthly store manager meetings and some ir-
regular training; however， store managers 0立endid not discuss their problems with others. 
It is important that the company takes seriously their problems and offers help when nec-
essary. This might seem to be common sense; however， itis often overlooked in practice. 
This might provide store managers with greater sense of belonging which results in be仕er
support合omthem. The most impo1'tant point is that the company should observe ca1'efully 
every step and influence their practices made to the stores. 
This paper has used the case of Ichi in Hong Kong to suggest the importance of ex-
amining employee relations together with the company's formal policy to understand the 
ideology of the company. As corporate ideology changes over time， itis necessary to con-
duct followぺlpresearch to find out what changes the company faces in accordance with the 
changing social and political environment in Hong Kong. Future studies wil benefit from 
comparison with other companies to further understand this dynamic and complex corpo-
rate culture. 
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